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ABSTRACT 
HOW I SPENT MY SUMMER DEFENDING-OR-DEFEATING ANSCOMBE: 
ANSCOMBIAN ACTION THEORY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LOGICALLY 
COMPLEX ACTIONS 
 
by 
 
Andrew Flynn 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Luca Ferrero 
 
 
 
This paper attempts to bridge the divide between action theorists who work in a conceptual 
terrain shaped primarily by Donald Davidson and Michael Bratman and action theorists who 
work in a conceptual terrain shaped primarily by G.E.M. Anscombe. In it, I consider a feature of 
action that has only been discussed by the Anscombe camp: the means-end structure of actions 
in their unfolding over time. Then, I draw out an implication of this feature: that actions can 
involve structure which is logically complex (that is, can involve means taken to a logically complex 
end). Next, I argue that numerous arguments made by philosophers in the Davidson-Bratman 
camp involve the tacit assumption that this is false, considering four such arguments—by 
Bratman, Kieran Setiya, Hugh McCann, and Richard Holton—in some detail. Given that 
structure is a neutral desideratum that any theory of action should account for, I argue that this 
assumption renders these arguments faulty and is evidence that these philosophers’ inattention 
to structure has radically circumscribed the conceptual space in which they operate. I conclude 
with some lessons about the importance of future exchanges between these two camps of action 
theorists.
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0. Introduction 
Imagine the following, bizarre hypothetical: you wake up one morning and find to 
your horror that your friends are all engaged in the weirdest activities, activities you’ve never 
even heard of before. Paul is having-beer-or-wine-with-dinner like there’s no tomorrow. Jack 
has started off on an epic session of buying-rice-milk-if-there’s-no more-almond-milk-left-at-
the-grocery-store. And, Heather is in the midst of finishing-that-novel-she-started-last-
weekend-unless-something-more-interesting-catches-her-eye-in-the-bookstore. What to 
make of this strange state of affairs? Unfortunately, I’m not around to help you out yet—I’m 
off in my library carrel, defending-or-defeating-the-philosophy-of-G.E.M.-Anscombe.  
Strange goings on! – to quote Donald Davidson.  
 Quite so. In this paper, however, I want to defend the existence of such strange 
goings on. Or, more precisely, I want to argue that recent discussions of the imperfective 
aspect and the structure of action by philosophers drawing on Anscombe’s work imply that 
such strange goings on exist. This is not, as it turns out, a trivial result. Philosophers of 
action divide, roughly, into two camps: those who work in conceptual terrain shaped 
primarily by Davidson and Michael Bratman (henceforth traditionalists) and those who work 
in conceptual terrain shaped primarily by Anscombe (henceforth Anscombians).1 These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The works I am thinking of here are the essays collected in the first section of Donald Davidson’s Essays on 
Actions and Events and Michael Bratman’s Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason—as well as his subsequent 
amendments made to the basic theory presented in that book—which have had a pervasive effect on how 
action theory is practiced in contemporary philosophy. On the Ansombian side, the locus classicus is 
Anscombe’s Intention, but two recent attempts to revive Anscombe’s work seem especially important: 
Reasonably Vicious by Candace Vogler and Life and Action by Michael Thompson. This is not to say that these 
are the only significant fault lines in action theory. For instance, see Setiya 2010 for a discussion of the 
numerous views that one could take on the nature of intentions, which contrasts the predominant 
traditionalist view that intentions are mental states with the Anscombian claim that they are not, but also 
considers philosophers, like George Wilson, who dissent from the predominant view, but not on explicitly 
Anscombian grounds. (See Wilson 1989.) Also, there are heated debates within each roughly defined camp, 
although they will tend to be debates that accept as given certain controversial theses, and then proceed to 
debate the implications or nature of those theses. So, for example, traditionalists take it as given that intention 
is some sort of mental state, but have fierce debates about the nature of the rational norms that govern that 
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philosophers disagree about a whole host of issues—whether action explanation is a species 
of efficient causal explanation, whether intentions are mental states at all, whether self-
knowledge is importantly connected with action—and the dialectic between the two camps 
is difficult to navigate, not insignificantly due to the fact that it is underdeveloped in the 
current literature. However, one subject that the Anscombians have focused on, but which 
has really not appeared on the radar of traditionalists, is the means-end structure of actions 
in their progressive unfolding over time.2 In this paper, I hope to show that numerous 
arguments in the traditionalist literature, due to inattention to this feature of actions, tacitly 
assume that actions with what I will call a logically complex structure—that is, actions that 
involve means taken to logically complex ends—do not exist. This assumption leads these 
philosophers to adopt less plausible positive positions than they are in fact entitled to.  I 
hope, then, that this paper shows that traditionalists ignore structure and aspect at their peril.   
 The paper will proceed as follows. In §1, I will introduce theses about aspect and the 
structure of actions commonly espoused by Anscombians. In §2, I will argue that these 
theses provide conceptual space for actions that have logically complex structures. In §3, I 
will offer a brief overview of the existing dialectic between traditionalists and Anscombians 
about structure and aspect. Then, I will consider four case studies to show that the 
traditionalist literature has operated in circumscribed conceptual space as a result of a failure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mental state. See, for example, Ferrero 2012a and Bratman 2012a. Anscombians, on the other hand, take it as 
given that a certain type of robust self-knowledge that Anscombe called “practical knowledge” is importantly 
connected to intentional action, but debate the nature of that knowledge. See, for example, Thompson 2011, 
Haddock 2011, and McDowell 2011. Finally, these are only rough constellations of positions that happen to 
hang together in the current literature. Some philosophers have mixed and matched positions in interesting 
ways. Kieran Setiya and J. David Velleman, for instance, have attempted to accommodate Anscombe’s points 
about the centrality of self-knowledge to action while maintaining that intention is a mental state. See Setyia 
2007, Setiya 2008, Setiya 2009, Setiya 2011, and Velleman 1989.  
2 Michael Bratman might take issue with being labeled a paradigmatic traditionalist, because he denies that he is 
guilty of an “eye-blink-like,” atomic view of action that Michael Thompson attributes to traditionalists. (See 
Bratman 2012b, pg. 8.) I think his denial is right; Bratman’s work is attuned to the temporal dimensions of 
agency. But, as I will argue in §3.3, Bratman is not sufficiently attentive to the means-end structure of actions 
that Anscombians take to be revealed in the unfolding of those actions over time.   
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to appreciate the possibility that actions might have logically complex structures.  First, I will 
show that a recent objection to the Anscombian position on prior intentions sketched by 
Kieran Setiya only makes sense on the assumption that actions cannot have logically 
complex structures. Second, I will demonstrate that a number of arguments made by 
Bratman, Hugh McCann, and Richard Holton urging either the acceptance of mental states 
weaker than intentions or the loosening of the rational norms governing intentions also 
tacitly assume that actions cannot have logically complex structures. In §4, I conclude with 
some brief observations about the importance of exchanges between traditionalists and 
Anscombians for future progress in action theory.   	  
1. Aspect and Structure 
1.1. Aspect 
In recent attempts to highlight the importance of Anscombe’s work, Anscombians 
have pointed to two features of intentional action that have gone missing from current 
discussions: aspect and structure.3 Traditionalists, Anscombians complain, treat intentional 
actions as though they were essentially point-like, non-enduring primitives: the flipping of 
light-switches and the pulling of triggers.4 But, nothing could be further from the truth. First, 
actions normally unfold over time, and so admit of what linguists refer to as aspectual 
distinctions. That is, they can either be completed or in progress towards completion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Some philosophers make much of the distinction between intentional actions and “plain-old” actions. See 
Vogler 2009 and Ford 2011, referencing Velleman and Frankfurt, among others. This distinction, however, 
does not play a role in the argument of this paper.  
4 Referring to his own Anscombian theory of intentional action, Michael Thompson writes: “That such a 
position seems strange... is in part a consequence of received conceptions of intentional action itself, above all, 
of the tendency of students of practical philosophy to view individual human actions as discrete or atomic or 
pointlike or eye-blink-like units that might as well be instantaneous for all that it matters to the theory” (2008, 
90-1). Candace Vogler concurs: “For all that...‘intentional action’ functions as a kind of unanalyzed primitive 
in contemporary work” (2001, 45).  On the relevance of these complaints to Bratman’s work, see footnote 
two.  
	  	  
4 
Actions described in the past tense admit of both imperfective and perfective aspect: “I was 
walking to the beach” and “I walked to the beach,” respectively. Actions described in the 
present tense only admit of imperfective aspect—“I am walking to the beach” – since if an 
action is currently taking place, it has not yet finished unfolding.5 
 
1.2. Structure 
Second, it looks like actions, considered in their unfolding in the imperfective aspect, 
have rich internal structures. Consider an instance of cake baking: this is not some 
unanalyzable, instantaneous occurrence. Rather, intentional actions are, the Anscombians 
point out,6 means-end structured events, where the end is some state of affairs that an agent 
aims to produce and the means are other intentional actions that an agent performs in virtue 
of the fact that she takes them to be productive of that state of affairs.7 So, an instance of 
cake baking involves, roughly, an agent’s aiming to produce a cake, and then performing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The most important recent discussion of aspect is chapter eight of Thompson 2008. Thompson is drawing on 
chapter eight of Kenny 1963, Mourelatos 1978, Mourelatos 1993, Galton 1984, and chapter four of Vendler 
1967.  See also Frey 2012, pgs. 11-15 and Moran and Stone 2011, pgs. 47-55. Anscombe does not spend much 
time discussing aspect in Intention, although she makes remarks about the progressive nature of actions in §23, 
p. 39. And, as Thompson notes, Anscombe’s writing offers a sharp contrast to Davidson’s in the following 
respect: Anscombe’s examples appear in the imperfective, whereas Davidson’s appear in the perfective. (See 
Thompson 2011, 203-4.)  
6 I say “point out” rather than argue, because Anscombians have been responding to a lack of discussion of 
structure at all in the literature, rather than disputing some other account of structure on offer. For the most 
developed discussion of the means-end structure of actions, see chapter six of Vogler 2002, especially pgs. 
127-35. See also Thompson 2008, pgs. 86, 93-4, and 106-12, and §§12, 22, 23, and 26 of Anscombe 2000. In 
addition, see Frey 2012, pgs. 15-27. Sergio Tenenbaum’s “Policy as Action Model” is also quite similar to 
Anscombian accounts of the structure of actions; see Tenenbaum 2010 and Tenenbaum 2012. Also, Ferrero 
2012b offers an interesting, roughly traditionalist discussion of closely related issues.  
7 This account of the structure of intentional actions raises some obvious worries about regress: if intentional 
actions are made up of intentional actions, then it looks like we’ve got intentional actions all the way down. 
Thompson, it seems, accepts as unproblematic the idea that intentional actions are gunky. (See Thompson 
2008, pgs. 106-12.) Vogler admits that we may bottom out with some intentional actions that are in fact 
unanalyzable primitives, but points out that these are extremely marginal instances of action. (See Vogler 2002, 
pg. 257n18.) See also Millgram 2012 for discussion of the differences between Thompson and Vogler.  
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other intentional actions—breaking eggs, mixing batter, pre-heating the oven—in virtue of 
the fact that she takes them to be productive of a state of affairs in which a cake exists.8   
This account of structure makes sense of why instances of identical action types 
might nevertheless also be instances of different, larger action types unfolding. The smaller 
intentional actions are not made fully intelligible until they are placed within the means-end 
structure of the larger intentional action of which they are parts.9 To use the Aristotelian 
slogan which Anscombians are fond of: the whole is prior to the parts.10 A particular 
breaking of eggs is an instance of a cake being made, and another is an instance of an omelet 
being made, because in each case the agent is breaking eggs as means to a different end.11  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Means and ends seem to be invoked as primitive notions in the recent Anscombian literature, but Anscombe 
seems to have understood the relation as I lay it out here: “That is to say: the future state of affairs mentioned 
must be such that we can understand the agent’s thinking it will or may be brought about by the action about 
which he is being questioned” (2000, 35). The notion of an agent performing some action in virtue of taking it 
to be productive of some state of affairs invoked here is rough and intuitive, but I think that this is all that is 
needed for the purposes of my paper; again, to invoke Anscombe: “I shall not try to elaborate my vague and 
general formula, that we must have an idea how a state of affairs Q is a stage in proceedings in which action P 
is an earlier stage, if we are to be able to say that we do P so that Q. For of course it is not necessary to 
exercise these general notions in order to say ‘I do P so that Q’. All that is necessary to understand is that to 
say, in one form or another: ‘But Q won’t happen, even if you do P’, or ‘but it will happen whether you do P 
or not’ is, in some way, to contradict the intention” (2000, 36).  
9 I am framing the issue here slightly differently than it sometimes appears in the literature. I am talking 
metaphysically, as it were, about intentional actions that are parts of a larger intentional action in virtue of being 
means to some end that is definitive of that action. Anscombians—and Anscombe herself—frequently talk 
more linguistically about a series of nested descriptions under which an agent is acting. (See, for example, 
Thompson 2008 and Anscombe 1979.) I’ve decided to do this, because it seems to me that fully 
understanding what Anscombians mean when they talk about acting under a particular description or series of 
descriptions is tightly bound up with controversial and difficult theses about practical knowledge—theses 
about which many of the philosophers I will discuss in the second half of this essay are skeptical. For my 
purposes, I don’t see that anything is lost by avoiding this question. 
10 See, for example, Thompson 2008, p. 112. 
11 The Anscombian account of structure should not be confused with an account of action individuation. 
Confusion might occur because Anscombe discusses action individuation in the context of means-end 
structure in §26 of Intention. In one of the only non-Anscombian discussions of these mereological issues 
related to action of which I am aware, Sara Rachel Chant’s “Two Composition Questions in Action,” the 
author, so far as I can tell, straightforwardly confuses the two issues.  Chant chooses to focus on mereological 
issues related to collective instead of individual action, because she takes the question of composition in 
individual action to be identical with the question of action individuation, and she takes action individuation 
to have been worked to death in literature.  (See Chant 2010, pgs. 28-30.)  But, it seems to me that these 
questions are pretty clearly distinct: offering an account of why pulling a trigger is identical to assassinating 
President Lincoln is different than explaining why buying a gun and deciding the best time to strike—two 
clearly non-identical intentional actions—are both parts of plotting to assassinate President Lincoln.  
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2. Extending the Anscombian Theses  
2.1. Logically Complex Structure  
Once we have the picture of intentional action sketched in the previous section, the 
following point becomes important: an agent might set ends that are logically complex. That 
is, for instance, an agent might set the end of buying rice milk at the grocery store if there is 
no almond milk left. Or, an agent might set the end of having either beer or wine with dinner. 
These ends involve complex amalgamations of states of affairs.12 In the first case, it seems 
that the agent is aiming at producing one state of affairs given certain conditions obtaining, 
or some other state of affairs otherwise. In the second case, the agent is aiming at producing 
either of two states of affairs. And, the agent can take means to such ends. Means to having 
beer or wine with dinner, for instance, will be intentional actions that are productive of either 
state of affairs obtaining—that is, either a state of affairs in which she’s consumed a glass of 
wine with dinner or a state of affairs in which she’s consumed a glass of beer with dinner—
and performed in virtue of that fact. These will be intentional actions that are neutrally 
productive of these two states of affairs—actions, like driving to the liquor store, which 
would equally further the agent’s progress towards both those states of affairs—or are 
productive of just having beer with dinner while not making it prohibitively costly to have 
wine with dinner, and vice versa. (For example, the action of pouring wine into a carafe is 
not directly productive of a state of affairs in which an agent has beer with dinner, but, given 
an agent’s normal background considerations, pouring wine into a carafe would not make it 
prohibitively costly to have beer with dinner—the way, say, spending all of her money on 
wine would—and an agent who had set the end of having beer or wine with dinner might 
perform it in virtue of this fact.)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Textor 2012 for an overview of states of affairs. I intend this paper to be neutral between substantive 
accounts of states of affairs.  
	  	  
7 
 When an agent is taking the means to such an end, what she is doing has the 
structure of a larger action unfolding, as per the Anscombian account. I will refer to such 
means-end structured events as having a logically complex structure, because they involve 
taking means to logically complex ends.13 For the rest of the paper, I will also focus primarily 
on a specific type of logically complex structure—disjunctive structure—since this will be 
most important for my criticisms of the traditionalist literature, although it seems to me that 
what I say should generalize to other instances of logically complex structure.14 To forestall 
any possible confusion, it is worth noting before I move on that these Anscombian points 
about aspect and structure are distinct from the now somewhat familiar Anscombian claim 
that there is no important distinction between intending and doing, although the points 
about aspect and structure might be used to motivate such a view. (See §§2.2 and 3.1.)  	  
2.2. Prima Facie  Worry Addressed  
There is a prima facie worry about the claim that actions could have logically complex 
structures, generated by the examples that I have used. These examples, someone might 
object, obscure an intuitive distinction between preparatory steps taken in order to be able to 
perform some future action and actions themselves. When an agent is taking means to the 
disjunctive end of having wine or beer with dinner, she is not already performing some 
larger intentional action, but rather preparing to do one of two different intentional actions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Some philosophers refer to actions in their unfolding over time as “processes” rather than “events,” or use 
the two terms seemingly interchangeably. See Thompson 2008 for interchangeable usage and Morelatos 1978 
for processes. I use “event” exclusively simply for clarity, not to make any broader philosophical point.  
14 It seems that any expression of intention with a logically complex object that can be cashed out in terms of 
means taken in virtue of the fact that they would allow for some amalgamation of states of affairs to come 
about can be captured by my account. Prima facie, it seems like conditionals, negation, and conjunction should 
be similar to disjunction. Regardless, disjunction is so widespread, as this paper will show, that even if my 
account only captured actions with disjunctive structures, it would still be philosophically interesting.  
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in the future: have wine with dinner or have beer with dinner. And, when she has beer with 
dinner—if that’s what happens—then she is no longer taking means to a disjunctive end.    
 However, I think that the Anscombian has a number of responses to this point. 
First, many of the Anscombians take it that one of the upshots of their account of the 
structure of actions is that there isn’t a sharp or philosophically interesting distinction 
between means that count as preparatory steps taken towards future actions and means that 
are constitutive of those actions, such that when an agent is taking preparatory steps, a larger 
action is unfolding just as it is when the agent is taking constitutive steps. 15   
Second, we can put aside controversial Anscombian arguments about the 
relationship between preparatory and constitutive means, and point out that if actions have 
structure, there doesn’t seem to be any principled reason to think that actions couldn’t have 
disjunctive structure, and that an agent couldn’t form a present-directed intention to carry 
out an action with a disjunctive structure now; we will see instances of what appear to be such 
actions in §§3.3-3.5.  
Third and most importantly, not only is it possible for actions themselves to have 
disjunctive structures, but most—perhaps nearly all—ordinary instances of actions do have 
such structures. To see this, consider that over the course of an action’s unfolding, an agent’s 
end may become more specific.16 Take an instance in which an agent takes the constitutive 
means of buying a bottle of wine. In the perfective, this will end up being an instance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Some Anscombians think that all we have is a long chaining of means to an end, which we may divide up in 
various ways, calling some parts “preparing” or “intending” and calling other parts “acting.” These 
distinctions are pragmatic, not metaphysical. As Anscombe points out, whether we say that we are going to ϕ 
or that we intend to ϕ, as opposed to saying that we are ϕ-ing, seems to depend on pragmatic concerns like 
our confidence in our success, not in anything about the underlying structure of what we are doing (2000, 39-
40). This point is also particularly clear in Thompson 2008, pgs. 138-46. See also McDowell 2010, pg. 147 and 
Moran and Stone 2011, pg. 53.  
16 Those familiar with Bratman’s work may see some similarity here with Bratman’s notion of the partiality of 
plans. (See Bratman 1987, pgs. 28-30.) I will argue, however, in §3.3 that Bratman fails to appreciate that 
actions themselves may be less specific than they will eventually become in the perfective, in virtue of having 
disjunctive structure.   
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something more specific: buying a bottle of Pinot Noir, let’s say. However, it need not be 
the case—nor would it usually be the case—that throughout the unfolding of the action, the 
agent was taking means to the end of buying a bottle of Pinot Noir. When the agent walked 
into the liquor store, she had only a more general end: to buy a bottle of wine. At some 
point, in order to complete this action, however, her end needed to become more specific. 
This seems like a pervasive phenomenon: over the course of an action, the state of affairs 
that one aims to produce becomes more and more specific.  
But, when the agent would explain what she was doing by reference to a more 
general end, rarely would it be the case that she was just taking means without regard to 
which different states of affairs falling under that general end she might produce. Rather, in 
most cases, the agent will be taking means in virtue of the fact that they would allow a long 
disjunctive list of states of affairs to obtain; she will avoid taking means that would make any 
of those states of affairs prohibitively costly. So, in a wine case, an agent would generally be 
taking means to a long disjunctive list of states of affairs: having bought a bottle of Pinot 
Noir, having bought a bottle of Pinot Grigio, having bought a bottle of Sauvignon Blanc, 
etc. In browsing around the store she is taking means that would enable her to buy any of a 
number of different bottles of wine, and she isn’t doing anything that would make 
actualizing any of those states of affairs prohibitively costly—say spending all of her available 
time in the white wine section of the store.17  
Many similar examples could be offered: it seems like almost any action that is 
structurally similar to the case of buying wine—an action in which the agent sets a general 
end, but needs at some point to choose to actualize some more specific state of affairs—is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Most agents would not self-consciously reflect about taking means to an explicitly thought out disjunctive list 
of states of affairs. But, the fact that an agent does not explicitly think about the structure of the action she is 
performing undermines the claim that the action has that structure only given implausible intellectualist 
assumptions that ignore the roles that habit and skill play in action. See Thompson 2008, pgs. 108-9. 
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going to have a disjunctive structure.	   The disjunctive nature of such cases is masked, 
however, because the agent would normally explain what she is doing by reference to a more 
general end, rather than listing the long disjunction of states of affairs she is aiming at. While 
someone who was taking means to having wine or beer with dinner might express her 
intention with the sorts of phrases alluded to in the introduction of this paper—“I’m having 
wine or beer with dinner!”—which make the disjunctive nature of the action apparent, this is 
not always the case. The agent taking means to buying a bottle of Pinot Noir, or buying a 
bottle of Pinot Grigio, or..., etc., will probably explain what she is doing by saying, “I’m 
buying a bottle of wine.” However, what she is doing is disjunctive in exactly the same sense 
as discussed above: she is taking means in virtue of the fact that they will allow her to realize 
either state of affairs A or state of affairs B or state of affairs C, etc. In §§3.3-3.5, I will discuss 
actions that have stark and apparent disjunctive structure, but this does not make them 
different in kind from actions like buying a bottle of wine. Disjunctive structure is 
pervasive.18 
Finally, for the sake of clarity, I should note that I am assuming here what I think is 
intuitive but which is not discussed anywhere in the literature on structure that I am aware 
of: what an action counts as an instance of at any point in time is fixed by the state of affairs 
that is realized or that the agent is in the progress towards. So, when an agent intentionally 
realizes a state of affairs in which a cake is baked, this is a completed instance of cake baking. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This phenomenon might not be as widespread if there is an important distinction between aiming to produce 
one state of affairs out of a disjunctive list of states of affairs and aiming to make determinate some now 
merely determinable state of affairs. I write here as if there is no such important distinction; I don’t think 
much hinges on this. The examples in the rest of this paper are all disjunctive in the relevant sense. But, one 
might think that one could be aiming to make determinate a merely determinable state of affairs without 
thereby aiming at anything as specific as realizing either state of affairs A or state of affairs B or state of affairs 
C, etc. Also, this will certainly hinge on one’s views about states of affairs. As Joshua Spencer has pointed out 
to me, one might have a coarse-grained view of states of affairs akin to David Lewis’s view of propositions. 
On a view of this sort, in which states of affairs are uniquely associated with sets of possible worlds, a 
determinable state of affairs would not be distinct from a long disjunctive list of states of affairs.    	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And when an agent is in progress towards producing either a state of affairs in which she’s 
had wine or a state of affairs in which she’s had beer, she’s having wine or beer. Whether or 
not we note this disjunction in the verb phrase or come up with a broader category to 
encompass it seems to be an issue of pragmatics.  
  
3. Importance of Logically Complex Structure 
3.1. Overview  
To this point, I have argued that on the Anscombian account of structure, actions 
may have logically complex, specifically disjunctive, structures, and that many ordinary 
actions in fact exhibit such structures. This is an interesting result in itself, since disjunctive 
structure has not been discussed in the literature.19 However, in the rest of the paper, I want 
to make a much stronger claim about disjunctive structure: there is good evidence that 
traditionalists have been working in circumscribed conceptual space as a result of their 
failure to appreciate the structure of actions that appears in the imperfective aspect. I will 
show that numerous arguments made by traditionalists are, in light of Anscombian points 
about structure, seriously flawed, and it seems likely these flaws stem from a failure to pay 
attention to the structure revealed in the imperfective aspect.  
As of this writing, traditionalists have not really engaged with Anscombian work on 
structure. As I noted earlier, Anscombians have pointed out that traditionalist work fails to 
pay much, if any, attention to the means-end structure that appears when actions are 
considered in the imperfective aspect. But, the importance of this oversight has not been 
made particularly clear. Traditionalists, it seems, have collectively shrugged. Surely, that the 
traditionalists have tended not to discuss structure and have tended to discuss actions only in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Ferrero 2010, pgs. 1-2, which notes that it is generally assumed that actions are not themselves 
“disjunctive.”  
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the perfective aspect may merely be benign omissions; it is not clear that these facts 
undermine their arguments. There have been some attempts to show that close attention to 
aspect lends support to specific, controversial Anscombian positions, most notably Michael 
Thompson’s argument that intentions are not mental states.20 But, traditionalists have not 
found these arguments convincing.21 Traditionalists might admit, then, that the Anscombians 
are right about structure—they’ve pointed to a neutral desideratum that any theory of action 
should be able to account for—and right in claiming that traditionalist work has not paid 
explicit attention to such structure, but still ask, “So what?”  
The rest of this paper answers that question. I will remain agnostic as to whether 
close consideration paid to aspect and structure lends support to any of the controversial 
Anscombian positions that pit them in opposition to the traditionalists. I will, however, 
consider a number of argumentative moves made by traditionalists, and argue that in light of 
the Anscombian account of structure and the conceptual space it provides for actions with 
logically complex structures, these moves are implausible and unmotivated. Further, I will 
argue that in each case the argumentative moves in question are plausible and motivated, 
however, given the implicit assumption that actions, in their progress towards completion, 
only involve means taken simply to produce the state of affairs that is eventually realized in 
the perfective—the state of affairs the agent counts as having intentionally produced when 
the action is completed—and not means taken to a disjunctive or otherwise logically 
complex list of states of affairs. (That is, for instance, in the case of an action which in the 
perfective is an instance of “buying a bottle of Pinot Noir,” where the agent has intentionally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Thompson 2008, pgs. 120-48. I take it that at least some Anscombians think that intentions, construed as 
isolatable mental states, cannot account for structure. Traditionalists who engage with Anscombians have 
disagreed and the dialectic is not far advanced. See Candace Vogler 2009, a recording available on the internet, 
especially the Q&A discussion between Vogler, Setiya, Agnes Callard, and Jennifer Hornsby. Also, see Ford 
2011.  
21 See Setiya 2010 and Speaks 2009.  
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produced a state of affairs in which a bottle of Pinot Noir is bought, that action in its 
unfolding only ever involved means taken simply to produce a state of affairs in which she’d 
bought a bottle of Pinot Noir, and not some logically complex end, like buying a bottle of 
Pinot Noir, or Pinot Grigio, or....) Indeed, in each case I think that it is very hard to motivate 
the philosopher’s argumentative move unless this is assumed, strongly suggesting the 
traditionalists are tacitly relying on this assumption.22 (Henceforth, I will call this the 
problematic assumption.) This assumption is false given that actions can have logically complex 
structures, but it would be an easy assumption to make if one primarily thought about 
actions in the perfective aspect. Since structure does not appear in the perfective aspect and 
since we almost never talk about completed actions in logically complex terms, one might 
easily assume that at every point in the action’s progression towards completion, the agent 
performing it was always aiming to produce just the state of affairs that is ultimately 
produced. Not only do the traditionalist’s arguments fail, then, but they probably fail due to 
reliance on an assumption that is held only because of an inattention to aspect and structure. 
Even if the reader is not convinced by these diagnostic inferences, though, I hope that it will 
be clear that in light of the Anscombian account of structure, numerous traditionalist 
arguments are insufficient. Anscombian complaints do have some bite, then, on the 
traditionalists’ own terms, and so traditionalists cannot shrug off structure. I will now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 There is conceptual space for a related, weaker assumption: although the state of affairs that an agent aims to 
produce may grow more specific over time, an agent must always be taking means simply to produce a single 
state of affairs, not to produce any of a number of states of affairs. In each case discussed, these assumptions 
have the same result. Each case involves an agent taking means to two distinct states of affairs that don’t, in 
the example provided by the philosopher, grow in specificity over time. The philosophers might, as I suggest, 
be assuming that actions can only be made up of means taken simply to produce the state of affairs that ends 
up obtaining when the action is completed. Or, they might be assuming that actions can only be made up of 
means taken simply to produce a single state of affairs, and that although that state of affairs might in 
principle become more specific over time, the only candidate for that single state of affairs in the cases in 
question is the state of affairs that ends up being realized when the action is completed. I discuss the first 
assumption for the sake of simplicity, but if you think it is more charitable to hold the second assumption, any 
of the arguments could easily be run using it. This appears to exhaust the conceptual space for denying that 
actions have logically complex structure. 
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demonstrate this by considering arguments by Kieran Setiya, Michael Bratman, Hugh 
McCann, and Richard Holton in turn.  
 
3.2. Kieran Setiya’s Objection 
First, I want to consider an objection to the Anscombian account of prior intention 
that has recently been sketched by Kieran Setiya.23 Traditionalists and Anscombians disagree 
about how to unify the guises of intention. This problem, a statement of which opens 
Anscombe’s Intention, starts from the observation that we talk about intention in three ways. 
First, we express prior intentions for future actions. (“I intend to go to the store 
tomorrow.”) Second, we discuss intentional actions. (“I’m intentionally taking a walk.”) 
Third, we offer intentions with which our actions are done. (“I’m taking a walk with the 
intention of going to the store.”) Anscombe thinks that intention is plainly not equivocal, and 
so we’ve got a puzzle: what unites these three disparate uses?24 There has been broad 
agreement amongst action theorists about the importance of this puzzle, although the 
dominant way of attempting an answer, the one favored by traditionalists, is not the one that 
Anscombe seems to have favored. Traditionalists have taken prior intention to be a mental 
state and attempted to make sense of how this mental state is connected to intentional action 
and intention-with-which. Anscombe scarcely discusses prior intention in Intention, but 
Anscombians have essentially wanted to reverse the traditionalist procedure and analyze 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It would not be fair to characterize Setiya as a paradigmatic traditionalist, although he is not a paradigmatic 
Anscombian either; he has a foot in each camp. (See footnote one.) Nevertheless, the argument I discuss here 
is faulty given the Anscombian account of structure. 
24 See Anscombe 2000, pgs. 1-2.  
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prior intention in terms of being, in some sense, already embarked upon the early stages of 
intentional action itself.25   
 This is a novel strategy which challenges a mode of proceeding that has essentially 
been orthodoxy in action theory since Davidson’s later work.26 But, in contrast to the 
traditionalist view, its details have not been worked out and it has lots of potential problems. 
Kieran Setiya states one of them as follows:  
It is a problem for the theory of intending as being embarked on intentional 
action that these objects can be logically complex. I intend not to be hit by a 
car as I walk home. I intend to drink wine or beer with dinner. I intend to 
read a book tonight if there’s nothing on the radio. In none of these cases 
can we say, without contrivance or difficulty, what action I am now on the 
way to performing. Until it is supplied with an account of these cases…the 
theory of intending as being embarked on intentional action remains 
incomplete. (Setiya 2010) 
 
When an agent forms a prior intention with—to continue this essay’s example—a 
disjunctive object, the normal purpose of forming such an intention, on any account of what 
prior intentions are, is to keep the agent’s options open for the time being. Normally an 
agent will form the prior intention to have wine or beer with dinner when she wants to keep 
open the option of having either wine or beer with dinner and plan the rest of her activities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Setiya 2010 for a detailed taxonomy of solutions to this problem. I think that some Anscombians would 
be unhappy with Setiya’s way of framing the issue. As Moran and Stone explain, it is not just that Anscombe 
opposed the particular way of connecting the three notions that became orthodox in action theory. Rather, 
Anscombe was opposed to what they call “connective strategies” in general, strategies which take there to be 
three guises that need connecting. Anscombe thought that all of our expressions of intention were ways of 
picking out different instances of a single underlying form. “Anscombe’s aim is to exhibit the unity of 
intention directly,” they write, “by subsuming the three divisions under a single form” (44). (See also Vogler 
2009.) However, I don’t think that much hangs on this; the response that I give to Setiya’s worry is to argue 
that prior intentions can have disjunctive structure, just as actions can. Whether we conceive of the 
Anscombian position as holding that prior intention involves already being embarked upon action, as Setiya 
explains it, or as holding that that prior intention is structurally of a piece with action, which seems closer to 
the way that Moran and Stone put things, does not affect whether its structure can be disjunctive. 
26 See “Intending” in Davidson 1980.  
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accordingly.27 This will require her to take means to the end of either having wine or having 
beer with dinner, performing intentional actions in virtue of the fact that they are neutrally 
productive of either a state of affairs in which she has beer or a state of affairs in which she 
has wine, or productive of just one of those states of affairs but without making the other 
prohibitively costly. But, as I’ve already discussed at length in this essay, this is just to be, on 
the Anscombian account of structure, performing an action that has a disjunctive structure.  
Of course, if the Anscombians are right and prior intentions involve being already 
embarked upon intentional actions, then the agent is performing an action that will 
eventually be, in the perfective, an instance of having beer with dinner, if that’s what 
happens. But, that doesn’t mean that the action, throughout its unfolding, involves only 
means taken to the end of having beer with dinner, as the earlier discussion of structure 
showed. And, although it is true that at the point in time at which the agent is carrying out 
an action with disjunctive structure, it is not determinate whether the action that is unfolding 
will—in the perfective—be an instance of having wine or an instance of having beer, this is 
also true, as I showed in §2.2, when an agent is taking the constitutive means of many 
actions. If it is supposed to be problematic that an agent can be embarked upon an action 
when it is not yet determinate what that action will be an instance of in the perfective, then 
everyone—traditionalists, Anscombians, and anyone in between—is in deep trouble, because 
paradigmatic cases of action have this feature. (We might also turn the tables on Setiya, and 
wonder how he can account for the intentions with logically complex objects of the sort that 
he finds unproblematic unless he accepts that actions can have the logically complex sort of 
structure that the Anscombian account makes room for. If agents cannot take means in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Ferrero 2010 for an illuminating account of disjunctive intentions that is basically traditionalist, 
presenting the issues in a more or less Bratmanian framework. Ferrero is also skeptical of partial attitudes like 
those introduced by Bratman and Holton, but for different reasons. (See especially pgs. 23-38.) 
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virtue of the fact that they are productive of either of two different states of affairs coming 
about—an action with logically complex structure on the Anscombian account—then what 
work is there for intentions with disjunctive objects to do?) 
 While the Anscombian may encounter some problems in denying that prior 
intentions are mental states, Setiya’s problem is not one of them. So why does Setiya think 
that it is hard to make sense of what the agent is doing without “difficulty” or 
“contrivance”? It is very hard to motivate his worry, unless one assumes that actions can 
only ever be made up of means taken simply to produce the state of affairs that the agent has 
intentionally produced when the action is completed. But, with this assumption in place, 
Setiya’s worry suddenly becomes very pressing. In this case, it can’t be that the agent is 
already embarked upon having beer with dinner, if that’s what happens, because she is not 
taking means simply to produce a state of affairs in which she’s consumed a glass of beer. 
Yet, that is what ends up happening, so for the Anscombian account of prior intention to 
work, it looks like that is the end the agent needs to be taking the means to. Perhaps, one 
might want to claim that an agent was already embarked upon both having beer and having 
wine with dinner, but only completed one. But, this seems wildly implausible: it fails to 
capture the exclusivity of the disjunction and seems to entail that there is a failed or 
abandoned attempt at having wine with dinner where there appears to be none.  So what is 
the agent supposed to be embarked upon?  
Given the Anscombian account of structure, however, the problematic assumption is 
false. Setiya’s objection either ignores the possibility that actions may be logically complex in 
their unfolding, or begs the question against the Anscombian by assuming that actions 
cannot be logically complex in their unfolding.  	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3.3. Michael Bratman’s Weaker Mental State 
Next, let’s consider an argument by Michael Bratman.28  Bratman offers the 
following thought experiment: an ambidextrous video game player is playing two of the 
same video game machines, one with each hand. The game involves shooting at a target. 
But, the video game machines are hooked up such that, if she hits either target—target A or 
target B—both machines will shut down. The most effective means of hitting one of the 
targets, though, is shooting at target A and shooting at target B, so this is what the video 
game player does, knowing that she can only hit one. And, when she does hit target A, she 
counts as hitting target A intentionally.29  
Bratman takes this to be a counterexample to a common assumption about the 
relationship between intentions and intentional actions, the “Simple View.” The Simple 
View holds that whenever an agent ϕs intentionally, she has the intention to ϕ. In Bratman’s 
video game example, the agent hits target A intentionally, so if the Simple View is correct, 
then the agent has the intention to hit target A, and this explains her shooting at target A. 
But, the agent is behaving identically with respect to the end of hitting target B—that is, she 
is shooting at target B with as much effort and skill as she is shooting at target A—so if her 
shooting at target A is explained by her intention to hit target A, it seems like her shooting at 
target B should be explained by an intention to hit target B. If the Simple View is correct, 
then, in the video game example the agent has the intention to hit target A and the intention 
to hit target B.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Bratman 1987, pgs. 111-27.  
29 This final assumption, that when the agent hits target A, she counts as having done so intentionally, is widely 
accepted.  See Setiya 2010. However, I think the Anscombians would reject it, since they tie intentional action 
so closely to self-knowledge, and since at no point in the unfolding of the action does the agent know 
anything as specific as that she is hitting target A. See Thompson 2011. For my purposes, this is a side issue.  
30 See Bratman 1987, pgs. 113-16.  
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Since the agent knows that it is impossible to hit both targets, however, this 
conclusion violates the principle of strong consistency, that an agent’s intentions should be 
synchronically consistent with all of her beliefs. (I.e. it should be possible for the agent’s 
plans to be successfully carried out if all of her beliefs are true.) And since the principle of 
strong consistency is required for intentions to serve as the planning states Bratman thinks 
that they are, he takes this to be a very bad conclusion. In the face of this argument, Bratman 
urges us to give up the Simple View.  
Bratman holds that there is a mental state bound by weaker norms, endeavoring, that 
makes sense of the rationality of the video game example. Endeavoring is a guiding desire 
that is not governed by the norm of strong consistency. So, in cases like the video game 
example, the agent hits target A intentionally, but, contrary to the Simple View, she never 
intended to hit target A. She endeavored to hit target A and endeavored to hit target B.31 
Bratman’s primary rationale for positing this new mental state seems to be the need 
to make sense of cases that are structurally identical to the video game example.32 However, 
in light of the Anscombian account of structure, the video game example seems to be an 
example of an action with disjunctive structure. The video game example seems structurally 
identical to having wine or beer with dinner, where the agent did things that were productive 
of having wine—pouring wine in a carafe—and things that were productive of having 
beer—putting beer in the fridge—but in virtue of the fact that they were productive of either 
state of affairs. Here, the agent has the end of either hitting target A or hitting target B, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See chapter nine of Bratman 1987. 
32 Bratman is actually interested in developing a larger account of the relation between intentions and 
intentional actions called the Single Phenomenon View, in which endeavorings play a crucial role, which he 
develops across chapters eight and nine of Bratman 1987. However, the attraction of the Single Phenomenon 
View is largely that it can make sense of cases that are structurally similar to the video game example. See 
Bratman 1987, pg. 137. Of course, even if Bratman has not sufficiently motivated the introduction of 
endeavorings, there might still be a role for endeavorings in the psychic economies of less than full-fledged 
planning agents. See Luca Ferrero 2010, pgs. 35-7.  
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she takes the means to this end; she shoots as hard as she can with each joystick in virtue of 
the fact that these actions are productive of either a state of affairs in which target A is hit or 
a state of affairs in which target B is hit.33 But, if the agent is performing an action with 
disjunctive structure, it doesn’t look like we need endeavorings at all. Since present-directed 
intentions have presently unfolding actions as objects, all we need is a present-directed 
intention to perform an action with disjunctive structure.34  
 Why, then, does Bratman think that he needs an additional mental state to make 
sense of the video game example? The move seems unmotivated, given the Anscombian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The details of this case might give one pause. It might seem that the agent was performing some intentional 
actions in virtue of the fact that they were productive simply of hitting target A and some intentional actions 
in virtue of the fact that they were productive simply of hitting target B. The agent isn’t performing any 
actions that are neutrally productive of either state of affairs coming about, and her shooting with joystick A 
doesn’t seem to be sensitive to her continuing to be able to shoot with joystick B, and vice versa. But, I think 
we can chalk this up to the quirky nature of the thought experiment: if an agent’s end is to either hit target A 
or hit target B and she wants to achieve this goal the most efficient way possible, the situation dictates that the 
agent behave just as she would if she were in the process of hitting both targets, because there are no available 
means that are neutrally productive of either state of affairs and nothing that the agent could do with one 
joystick affects what she does with the other joystick.  And since the world ultimately determines which 
disjunct is realized—not the agent in some future phase of the action, as in the cases I’ve discussed so far—
and the agent doesn’t care which disjunct is realized, she need not be careful not to let one of the two targets 
be hit until some future point in time is reached. Thus, the agent’s behavior looks to an observer deceptively 
like the behavior of someone who is in the process of hitting target A and hitting target B. But consider the 
following counterfactual: halfway through the game, the agent notices that one of the joysticks is non-
responsive, and concludes that contrary to initial assessments, the most effective way of hitting either of the 
targets would be to start taking means simply to hitting target A, so she stops shooting with joystick B instead 
of trying to fix it. If, as Bratman thinks, this agent was taking means independently to hit target A and to hit 
target B, explained by parallel mental states, then what explains why the agent stops taking the means to hit 
target B? The only answer that Bratman has, I think, is to acknowledge that the agent was not taking means 
simply to hitting target B in the first place, but to hitting either of the two targets, which is just to say the 
agent was carrying out an action with disjunctive structure. 
34 At least Bratman talks as though the object of a present-directed intention is an agent’s presently unfolding 
action. See chapter eight in Bratman 1987, where he generally talks about intentions to hit target A, where 
hitting target A is the action which the agent is currently carrying out. But, in general, what the object of an 
intention is supposed to be is not made explicitly clear in most of the writers that I will consider. Philosophers 
frequently use the common infinitival construction—X intends to ϕ—which suggests that a present-directed 
intention has a presently unfolding action as its object, but without ever making their commitments explicit.  
In a forthcoming paper arguing that actions are not the objects of intentions, Luca Ferrero notes that this is a 
common assumption and that philosophers are often less than careful when discussing the objects of 
executive attitudes. See Ferrero 2012b, pg. 6. For the ease of exposition in this paper, I will assume that all of 
the philosophers I discuss hold that the object of a present-directed intention is a presently unfolding action. I 
don’t think that assuming this begs any questions, though, because it seems to me that regardless of what we 
take the object of the intention to be, it must be able to account for the intentionality of the action that is 
currently unfolding, and on the Anscombian account of structure, currently unfolding actions may have 
disjunctive structures.   
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account of structure. It does seem quite plausible, however, if Bratman holds the assumption 
that actions can only involve means taken simply to produce the state of affairs that the 
agent counts as having produced intentionally when the action is completed. If the agent’s 
eventual hitting of target A can, in its unfolding over time, only involve means taken to 
hitting target A, the only plausible candidates for these means in this case are the agent’s 
shooting with joystick A. But, if these actions are explained by one mental state, then it looks 
like we are going to need two different mental states, for the reason expressed in Bratman’s 
argument above: the agent is also performing means that are productive of a state of affairs 
in which target B is hit, and these call for the same sort of explanation. The mental state 
cannot be an intention, however, since this would violate strong consistency. To solve this 
problem, we could posit another mental state, the rationality of which is not governed by 
strong consistency, which is what Bratman does. 
The way Bratman initially sets up both the Simple View and the video game example 
further suggests that he holds the problematic assumption. Given the Anscombian view of 
structure, the Simple View, as Bratman states it, is crucially ambiguous. When an agent 
successfully ϕs intentionally, ϕ stands for a completed instance of an action in the perfective 
aspect. But, when an agent has a present-directed intention to ϕ, ϕ stands for an action that 
is currently unfolding in the imperfective aspect. On the Anscombian account of structure, 
the action that is currently unfolding might not only involve means taken simply to produce 
the state of affairs that is realized when the action is completed. Given that an intention has 
a presently unfolding action as its object, it looks like there are two different matches 
between intention and action that might obtain. An agent’s intention might have as its object 
an action with a certain type of structure, and it might match the action that is currently 
unfolding in virtue of the fact that the action currently unfolding has the same type of 
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structure. Or, an agent’s intention might have as its object an action with a structure that 
involves means taken simply to hitting target A, and it might match—in some sense—the 
action in the perfective in virtue of the fact that an action with a structure that involves 
means taken simply to hitting target A is currently unfolding and target A is eventually hit. 
Which match is required by the Simple View? Bratman doesn’t say. However, the need to 
make this distinction would not arise if one assumed that actions in their unfolding could 
only involve means taken simply to produce the state of affairs which is realized when the 
action is completed.  
Further, on neither reading of the Simple View offered in the previous paragraph 
does the video game example show that the Simple View is false in virtue of violating strong 
consistency, unless the Simple View is supplemented with the problematic assumption. On 
the first reading, the video game example does not show that the Simple View is false at all. 
The video game example shows that there are some actions in which the agent was never 
taking means simply to the end of hitting target A, but this doesn’t mean that, throughout 
the unfolding of the action, the agent didn’t have an intention to be carrying out an action 
with the structure of the action that she was in fact at that time carrying out. All that is 
shown is that there are actions which have disjunctive structures throughout the entirety of 
their unfolding in the progressive. On the second reading, the video game example does show 
that the Simple View is false, because the video game example shows that there are actions 
that have disjunctive structures at every point in their unfolding. But, on this reading the 
Simple View is false not because it dictates that an agent has intentions that violate strong 
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consistency, but because some actions don’t have the sort of structure that the Simple View 
requires.35  
Given the assumption that, in its unfolding over time, the intentional action of 
hitting target A can only involve means taken simply to the end of hitting target A, however, 
the Simple View requires that the agent have a present-directed intention to carry out an 
action with that structure.  But, given considerations of symmetry that Bratman cites—that 
the agent is behaving identically with respect to the goal of hitting target B—it looks like we 
should also attribute to the agent a present-directed intention to carry out an action whose 
structure involves means taken simply to the end of hitting target B. Since the agent knows 
that she cannot successfully complete both of these actions, the Simple View requires 
conflicting intentions.  
Finally, it is worth noting that Bratman’s discussion of why the video game example 
counts as an instance of hitting target A intentionally seems oblivious to the possibility that 
an action might not only be made up of means taken simply to produce the state of affairs 
that is intentionally realized. Bratman juxtaposes an agent’s behavior being guided 
specifically by target A in the video game example with an example in which an agent’s 
behavior is guided by a combination of two targets that are too close to distinguish, without 
seeming to realize that the agent’s behavior being guided specifically by target A is consistent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 One might think that the end that the agent is taking the means to at the moment at which an action is 
completed fixes the correct description of the state of affairs that the agent counts as having intentionally 
produced, and so in the video game example, the agent has only intentionally realized a state of affairs in 
which either target A or B is hit. I think Anscombians think this; see Thompson 2011.  If this were the case, 
the video game example would not be a counterexample to the assumption I’m discussing. But, some of 
Bratman’s key reasons for thinking that the video game example is an instance of hitting target A 
intentionally—e.g. that observational knowledge of target A being hit causes the agent to stop acting—are 
independent of considerations of what means the agent was taking at the moment at which the action was 
completed (117-19). So, if he were to recognize disjunctive structure, I think he would conclude that the video 
game example is an instance of hitting target A intentionally with entirely disjunctive structure.  
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both with instances in which agents are simply taking the means to hit target A and instances 
in which they are trying to hit either target A or B.36  
In summary, it looks like Bratman’s argument requires the problematic assumption 
in order to be plausible. Given the Anscombian account of structure, however, the 
problematic assumption is false.  
 
3.4. Hugh McCann’s Softening of Rational Requirements  
Hugh McCann offers a defense of the Simple View against Bratman’s argument. 
McCann argues that the norm of strong consistency governing the rationality of intentions is 
potentially defeasible and that there is no better evidence for thinking that there are in fact 
exceptions to this norm than the video game example itself; the example shows that it is 
sometimes rational to form inconsistent intentions.37 So, Bratman’s introduction of 
endeavorings is insufficiently motivated, because one need not posit endeavorings if it is 
acceptable to form inconsistent intentions. 
But, the specific details of McCann’s critique are not important here. What is 
important is that even though he avoids Bratman’s bloated mental ontology, he still agrees 
with Bratman that the Simple View requires that in the video game example the agent have 
inconsistent intentions, for the reasons of symmetry that Bratman cites. However, as I 
argued in the previous section, the Simple View only requires that an agent have conflicting 
intentions given the problematic assumption. McCann’s loosening of the rational 
requirements on intentions is only required, then, if one assumes that actions in their 
unfolding can only involve means taken simply to produce the state of affairs which the 
agent ultimately counts as having produced intentionally. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Bratman 1987, pgs. 117-19.  
37 See McCann 1998.  
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One might worry that the problems Bratman is concerned with are simply being 
pushed back a step: if an agent can form the intention to carry out an action which currently 
has disjunctive structure, it looks like she can form an intention to perform an action with a 
disjunctive structure of the sort that consistency norms on intention were supposed to rule 
out as irrational. But, as both McCann and Luca Ferrero have pointed out, the intuition 
behind consistency norms is tied to self-defeat: it is irrational for an agent to set out on 
mutually incompatible projects, because her efforts will be frustrated.38 This point should 
carry over to the structure of actions. It is usually self-defeating to take the means to either 
of two different states of affairs all the way up to the point at which it would be impossible 
not to realize one of the states of affairs, and so agents who intend to perform actions with 
disjunctive structures past a certain point are irrational in virtue of pursuing a self-defeating 
course of action. But, there is nothing in itself irrational about taking means in virtue of the 
fact that they are productive of either of two state of affairs, and in the video game example, 
it is rational to perform an action with disjunctive structure throughout, since it is not self-
defeating. 	  
3.5. Richard Holton’s Partial Intentions 
Finally, a related oversight occurs in an argument Richard Holton makes for the 
introduction of partial intentions.39 Holton motivates his move with the following scenario: 
you want to remove a tree that has fallen down and is currently blocking your driveway, 
trapping your car. You conclude that there are four plausible ways to move the tree: lever it 
with a crowbar, cut it into pieces with a chainsaw, tie a rope to it and pull it with your car, or 
pay a bunch of money to the local tree company to move it for you. You start acting on all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See McCann 1998, pgs. 196-99 and Ferrero 2010, pgs. 12-21. 
39 See chapter two of Holton 2009.  
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of these possibilities: you’d prefer not to have to pay, but you call the tree company and 
make an appointment just in case. Then, since you aren’t sure that you will succeed at any of 
the three ways of removing the tree, you gather up your chainsaw, some rope, and a crowbar 
and head to the tree. 
 What intention do you have in this case? Holton wants to use this case to motivate 
the introduction of partial intention, a practical attitude that is supposed to be analogous to the 
widely accepted partial belief. In this scenario, Holton thinks that you have an all-out 
intention—that is, a plain old intention: the planning attitude we are familiar with from 
Bratman’s work and the subsequent traditionalist literature—to remove the tree. But, in 
addition, you have four partial intentions: to lever it with a crowbar, to cut it into pieces with 
a chainsaw, to tie a rope to it and pull it with your car, and to have the tree company move 
it.40 Holton defines partial intention as follows:  
An intention is partial iff it is designed to achieve a given end E and it is 
accompanied by one or more alternative intentions also designed to achieve 
E. If an intention is not partial it is all-out. (36) 
 
That is, like endeavorings, partial intentions are what are present when agents are 
aiming at co-impossible ends. The relationship of partial intentions to principles of 
consistency is a bit more complicated than in Bratman’s case, and Holton’s dialectic is more 
complex: he is not as interested in the Simple View as he is in the puzzling fact that it seems 
like agents might have practical attitudes that are to some extent partial—attitudes that aim 
at some goal and explain behavior towards that goal, even though an agent is not so sure that 
she will actually reach the goal, and has thus formed contingency plans. Though questions of 
partiality are interesting and the Anscombian ought to grapple with them, I want to table 
these concerns here, and focus on Holton’s reasons for thinking that partial intentions are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Holton 2009, pgs. 34-7.	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necessary. Like the video game case, Holton’s example seems to be an action with 
disjunctive structure. Why not think that in this situation, the agent has an all-out intention 
to perform an action with disjunctive structure that involves taking the means to either 
levering the tree with a crowbar, or cutting it into pieces with a chainsaw, or... etc.? 
Holton considers the possibility that a single present-directed intention—what he 
calls a disjunctive intention—might be able to explain what the agent is doing, but rejects 
this option. It will be useful to quote his reasons for doing so in full:  
Of course we could say that [you have a disjunctive intention]; but to say that 
would be to lose explanatory force. For we need to break compound 
intentions down into their elements if we are to understand quite what 
explains what. Consider a parallel example with ordinary all-out intentions. 
Here presumably conjunction is permissible: if I intend to hear a concert and 
intend to buy some whisky, then I intend to hear a concert and buy some 
whisky. But we would not want to be constrained to use only the conjunctive 
sentence. It is my intention to hear the concert that explains why I buy a 
ticket; it is my intention to buy some whiskey that explains why I divert to 
the off-license. It is only if we break down the intention into consistent 
atoms that these explanations become available. The same is true when we 
try to give all-out disjunctive surrogates for partial intentions. It is my partial 
intention to get the tree company to move the tree that causes me to phone 
them; if we are limited just to all-out disjunctive intentions, we can give no 
explanation of this. (38) 
 
Holton’s reasoning in this paragraph is fairly opaque, but it amounts, I think, to something 
like the following: 
1) An agent’s ϕ-ing is explained just in case an agent has an intention the object of 
which is only that action: ϕ-ing.  
2) Intentions with logically complex objects have more than one action as their object. 
3) Therefore intentions with logically complex objects do not explain an agent’s ϕ-ing.41 
 
I am not exactly sure why Holton thinks that the first premise is true. The paragraph 
quoted above seems to involve the assertion of the premise coupled with elaboration that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Holton’s language suggests he might think that the object of an intention is not an action, but a state of 
affairs. But, see footnote thirty-four.  
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supposed to appeal to the reader’s intuitions: when an agent buys a bottle of whisky, this 
action is explained by an intention that has just that action as its object. But, these intuitions 
seem to be heavily dependent on the fact that Holton draws no explicit connections between 
the two actions in this paragraph. If carrying out the action of buying a bottle of whiskey and 
carrying out the action of going to a concert required that you make sure you budget enough 
time on the way to the concert to be able to stop for whiskey, it becomes less clear that an 
intention that has two actions as its objects has no explanatory power.42 The intention to 
both buy a bottle of whiskey and attend a concert seems to explain why the agent stopped at 
the particular time she did, etc., which the mere intention to buy a bottle of whiskey does 
not.43  
Regardless, I think that we can grant premise one to Holton for the sake of 
argument. Premise two is another story. This claim seems to be supported in the paragraph 
above with appeal to the intuition that when an agent would express the intention to ϕ and 
ψ, ϕ-ing and ψ-ing are two different actions, and the agent is not expressing the intention to 
do something over and above those two actions. But, while this is good evidence that in the 
particular example, when the agent would express a conjunctive intention, the object of that 
intention was two actions, rather than a single, conjunctive action, it is not clear why this is 
good evidence for the general claim that when an agent would express a present-directed 
intention with a logically complex object, the object involves multiple actions, rather than a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Perhaps Holton has some notion of necessitation in mind in the background: an intention explains some 
action just in case it necessitates that action. But—this line of thought goes—a disjunctive intention would 
necessitate neither of its disjuncts, and therefore could not be explanatory. But, this seems broadly 
implausible: the intention to go to the store necessitates neither putting my right shoe on first nor putting my 
left shoe on first, but it seems like it explains whichever happens.  Thanks to Joshua Spencer for suggesting 
this reading of Holton.  
43 Luca Ferrero suggests a similar, related argument in Ferrero 2010, pgs. 27-30. 	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single action with logically complex structure. Surely, this requires additional evidence, and 
Holton has failed to make his case that partial intentions are necessary.  
However, Holton’s argument seems plausible if he intends the example in the quoted 
paragraph not as a case from which to generalize about all logically complex intentions, but 
rather as an appeal to his readers’ intuitions in favor of the problematic assumption we’ve 
been discussing. The conjunctive intention doesn’t simply happen to have multiple actions as 
objects in this case, but it must, since all actions are like those in the example: involving only 
means taken to the state of affairs that is eventually realized. The intentions that have these 
sorts of actions as their sole objects always have logically simple form; the intention to buy a 
bottle of whisky has as its sole object an action involving means taken simply to produce a 
state of affairs in which a bottle of whisky is purchased.  So not only the conjunctive 
intention, but all logically complex intentions, must have multiple actions as their objects. 
They therefore lack explanatory power. However, if the Anscombian account of structure is 
correct, Holton’s intuition pump is faulty. Actions can have logically complex structure, and 
logically complex intentions have an explanatory role to play. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that on an Anscombian account of structure, actions may 
have logically complex structures, and then I surveyed four different arguments made by 
traditionalists that only work if we assume this to be false, an assumption these philosophers 
likely make for lack of considering means-end structure at all. These are only the most 
apparent examples: arguments made by major action theorists that focus on instances of 
action where, due to special circumstances, the disjunctive structure becomes much more 
apparent than it otherwise would be. But, I suspect that this assumption infects other 
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arguments in ways that are not as readily apparent. In fact, given that traditionalists 
frequently talk about present-directed intentions to ϕ, where ϕ-ing is what the action will be 
an instance of in the perfective, even though the action may, at the present moment, not 
involve means taken to an end that is that specific yet, I suspect that similar problems may 
arise in many discussions of present-directed intentions.  
And, there is a deeper problem here: action theorists are usually unclear about what 
they take to be the object of intention. In this paper, I assumed for ease of exposition that 
the philosophers I was discussing all thought that the object of a present-directed intention 
was a presently unfolding action. But none of these philosophers is particularly clear on this 
point, relying on the reader to grasp intuitively what is going on when they say that some 
agent “intends to ϕ.” This suggests that the object of the intention is some action, but it is 
never specified whether the action is supposed to be an action described in the perfective or 
imperfective aspect. Even worse, some action theorists shift from talking about intentions to 
ϕ to talking about intentions for certain goals or ends, which makes it sound like the object 
of an intention is supposed to be a state of affairs, not an action.44 This lack of clarity is 
generally problematic, but especially so if actions can have structure that unfolds in the 
imperfective. If action theorists think that intentions have presently unfolding actions as 
their objects, their arguments fail for the reasons cataloged in this paper. If they think that 
intentions have completed actions as their objects, they are in dire straights, because this 
simply begs the question against the Anscombian; if the Anscombians are right, then two 
identical completed actions—two instances of cake bakings—might have different structures 
in their unfolding over time, and it is hard to see how intentions with identical objects could 
account for this. And if they think that intentions have states of affairs as their objects, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See footnote thirty-four. 
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seems clear that for the same reason an agent can take the means to producing either of two 
states of affairs, an intention might take as its object either of two states of affairs. In the 
current literature, though, it is not even clear how the issue needs to be resolved. Getting 
clear on structure requires getting clear on the object of intention.  
I hope, then, that this paper has shown this much: no action theorist can ignore 
structure. The current dearth of interactions between traditionalists and Anscombians is 
somewhat understandable. Although they work on and disagree about many of the same 
issues, these camps work from some very different basic assumptions, and so many 
arguments by thinkers in one camp may seem to be missing the point to philosophers in the 
other camp. And so, perhaps many traditionalists take there to be little reason to engage with 
the Anscombians. However, as this paper has discussed, structure is—at least prima facie—a 
neutral desideratum for which all theories of action should account. If I am right, 
traditionalists need either to reject the Anscombian account of structure or—what I think is 
much more likely—seriously reconsider a number of their arguments.   
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